Northwestern University School of Law

Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons
Faculty Working Papers

2010

How Shall I Praise Thee? Brian Leiter on Respect
for Religion
Andrew Koppelman
Northwestern University School of Law, akoppelman@law.northwestern.edu

Repository Citation
Koppelman, Andrew, "How Shall I Praise Thee? Brian Leiter on Respect for Religion" (2010). Faculty Working Papers. Paper 28.
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/facultyworkingpapers/28

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Working Papers by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

Draft: Jan. 5, 2010
Please do not cite or quote
No Respect:

Brian Leiter on Religion

Andrew Koppelman*
Is there any moral justification for the way American law
singles out of religion for special protection? What is the
appropriate moral attitude to take toward religion?
In two recent papers,1 Brian Leiter argues that there is no
good reason for law to single out religion for special
treatment, and that religion is not an apt candidate for respect
in the ―thick‖ sense of being an object of favorable appraisal.
Special treatment would be appropriate only if there were some
―moral reason why states should carve out special protections
that encourage individuals to structure their lives around
categorical demands that are insulated from the standards of
evidence and reasoning we everywhere else expect to constitute
constraints on judgment and action.‖2 Favorable appraisal would
be called for ―[o]nly if there were a positive correlation
between beliefs that were culpably without epistemic warrant and
valuable outcomes.‖3
Both arguments depend on a radically impoverished
conception of what religion is and what it does.
In this paper, I will explain what Leiter leaves out, and
offer an hypothesis about why. I will also engage with some
related reflections by Simon Blackburn and Timothy Macklem, both
of whom influence, in different ways, Leiter‘s analysis.
I. Toleration and Conscience
In his earlier article, Leiter frames the problem as
whether religion should be singled out for ―special

* John Paul Stevens Professor of Law and Professor of Political Science,
Northwestern University. I am doubly grateful to Brian Leiter, for his
essays that have challenged me to clarify my position, and for generous
comments on two earlier drafts. Thanks also to Marcia Lehr for research
assistance, and to Al Alschuler, Kenworthey Bilz, Valerie Quinn, and Regina
Schwartz for helpful conversation.
1
Foundations of Religious Liberty: Toleration or Respect?, draft of Sept.
15, 2009, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1474324; Why Tolerate
Religion?, 25 Const. Comm. 1 (2008).
2
Why Tolerate Religion?, at 25.
3
Foundations, at 27.
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consideration as opposed to other matters of conscience.‖4 The
moral basis for religious toleration, he claims, must be ―that
religious beliefs are often matters of conscience, and thus
would fall within the scope of any argument, like the Rawlsian
one, for protecting liberty of conscience.‖5 Religion is of
moral interest only because and insofar as it is a species of
conscience.6 The puzzle, then, is why ―[f]eatures that all and
only religious beliefs have‖7 should provide reasons for singling
them out for special protection.
This way of setting up the problem generates his working
definition of religion:
(1) Religious belief issues in categorical demands on
action, that is, demands that must be satisfied, no matter
4

Why Tolerate Religion?, at 7.
Id. at 12; for other formulations that emphasize conscience, see also id. at
20, 24 n.58, 25, 26.
6
There are two passages in Why Tolerate Religion? in which he indicates that
he has a different set of concerns. He states that he will ―confine my
attention to the principled reasons why the state should refrain from a
distribution of benefits and burdens that has as its intended consequence the
disfavoring of religion or of particular religions.‖ Why Tolerate Religion?,
at 5. This has nothing to do with conscience. The state can burden
conscience without intending to. That is the issue in the religious
accommodation cases. If your central concern is burdens on conscience, why
should it matter what the state intends? There are also many ways of
distributing burdens that disfavor some religions without encumbering
anyone‘s conscience, such as religious displays or the official endorsement
of religious propositions. See my Religious Establishment and Autonomy, 25
Const. Comm. 291 (2008).
This statement of his purpose is puzzling for other reasons: if his
worry is unjustified singling out of religion for special favor, then he
should be equally worried about a distribution of benefits and burdens that
has as its intended consequence the favoring of religion or of particular
religions. (The Court has gone back and forth about whether such singling
out of religion is constitutionally required, but it has been steadfast in
holding that it is permissible.)
The second passage says that questions about legal accommodation will
be addressed in a later paper, and notes with approval the idea (argued by
Martha Nussbaum) ―that ‗equal respect‘ considerations are likely to demand
substantial religious accommodation, given the ease with which ‗neutrality‘
considerations will favor the de facto dominant religious culture.‖ Why
Tolerate Religion? at 27 n.60. Here the concern is majoritarian bias: for
example, in a society suspicious of recreational drugs but in which there is
a large Catholic population, drug use favored by the dominant religion, such
as the consumption of wine, will not be criminalized, while minority drugs
such as peyote are likely to be less well treated.
This argument, to work,
needs further specification. The fact that you‘re on the losing side of a
political debate does not state an equality claim in any other context. Why
is losing a religiously inflected debate different, unless religion is
something distinctively important?
Because he never returns to these themes, but instead focuses fairly
consistently on conscience, I will ignore these passages hereafter.
7
Why Tolerate Religion?, at 12.
5
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what an individual‘s antecedent desires and no matter what
incentives or disincentives the world offers up; and,
(2) Religious beliefs do not answer ultimately (or at the
limit) to evidence and reasons, as evidence and reasons are
understood in other domains concerned with knowledge of the
world. Religious beliefs, in virtue of being based on
―faith,‖ are insulated from ordinary standards of evidence
and rational justification, the ones we employ in both
common-sense and in science.8
Part (1) of the definition isolates those aspects of religion
that generate conscientious objections to laws. Part (2) then
tries to delimit the pertinent quality that makes a subset of
the demands described in part (1) religious.
As a semantic matter, this is a curious definition of
religion. The emphasis on conscience focuses excessively on
duty, which is only a small part of religious motivation. Many
and perhaps most people engage in religious practice out of
habit, adherence to custom, a need to cope with misfortune,
injustice, temptation, and guilt, curiosity about religious
truth, a desire to feel connected to God, or happy religious
enthusiasm, rather than a sense of duty prescribed by sacred
texts or fear of divine punishment.9 The most recent
Congressional pronouncement on religious liberty, the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, declares
that ―[t]he term ‗religious exercise‘ includes any exercise of
religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system
of religious belief.‖10
But perhaps Leiter is uninterested in the semantic meaning.
He cites with approval Timothy Macklem‘s objection to reliance
on the semantic meaning of religion as a moral category.11
Macklem observes that the question of what ―religion‖
conventionally means is a semantic one, but the question of what
beliefs are entitled to special treatment is a moral one, and it
requires a moral rather than a semantic answer. So Leiter may
8

Why Tolerate Religion?, at 15.
See Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1,
25–26; William Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism,
58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 308, 321 (1991); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of
Religion, 1985 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 27.
10
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A). Some of the state statutes mandating religious
accommodation have similar language. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §41-1493
(West 2004); Fla. Stat. Ann. §761.02 (West Supp. 2004); Idaho Code §73-401
(Michie Supp. 2004); 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 35/5 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004);
Mo. Ann. Stat. §§1.302 (West Supp. 2004); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.
§§110.001 (West Supp. 2004). But see 71 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§2403 (West
Supp. 2004)(adopting a more restrictive definition of a substantial burden).
11
Why Tolerate Religion?, at 13 n.30, citing TIMOTHY MACKLEM, INDEPENDENCE OF MIND
120-26 (2006).
9
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be untroubled by the oddness of his definition.12 The definition
of ―religion‖ just discussed is meant to capture what is singled
out for ―the special treatment it [religion] is accorded in, for
example, American and Canadian constitutional law.‖13
If American law is what he‘s interested in, however,
conscience is a misleading place to begin. Some special
treatment of religion can easily fit under the rubric of
conscience; some much less so. It is most relevant if one is
considering religious accommodation, such as the exemption of
Quakers from the military draft, and there is some evidence that
this is what Leiter has in mind.14 This was once
constitutionally required. It is no longer, but religion still
gets special protection not accorded to other beliefs,15 and the
state is allowed to single out religion for accommodation.
Even accommodation is not just about conscience, however.
Many religious claims that are uncontroversially weighty, and
12

He does, however, work hard to show that his definition fits the semantic
meaning, conceding that it would be problematic if it included Marxism or
morality as such.
13
Why Tolerate Religion?, at 2. It is not clear how important the special
treatment of religion in constitutional law is to his argument; in the
preceding sentence he refers to the problem as whether ―we ought to accord
special legal and moral treatment to religious practices,‖ id., as if this
were the same thing. In fact, American law does pervasively give special
legal and moral treatment to religious practices, although much of this is
not constitutionally compelled. For example, federal law (with respect to
federal statutes) and many state statutes require that burdens on religion be
lifted unless they are the least restrictive means for achieving a compelling
state interest. For a survey, see Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships,
the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but
Missing the Liberty, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 155, 211-12 & nn.368-73 (2004).
14
The one specific example of special treatment of religion that he discusses
is the case of Sikhs who feel obligated to carry ceremonial knives, even in
school. Why Tolerate Religion?, at 11-12, 26 n.59. He is right that the
Canadian court that took up this issue may have been too deferential to the
Sikhs, but this is a distraction from the issue that should really concern
him: the fact that the Sikhs had a right to bring a claim to court in the
first place, a claim that would have been summarily dismissed had it been
nonreligious.
15
The privileged status of religion is somewhat diminished after Employment
Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), which held that there is no right to
religious exemptions from laws of general applicability. Even after Smith,
however, religions retain some special protection that nonreligious beliefs
do not share. In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520 (1993), the Court struck down four ordinances that a city had enacted with
the avowed purpose of preventing a Santeria church from practicing animal
sacrifice. The laws, the Court held, violated the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment because their object was the suppression of a religious
practice. Id. at 542, 547. The result would have been different if the law
had targeted a club that did exactly what the Santeria did, not as part of a
religious ritual, but because its members thought that killing animals was
fun.
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which nearly everyone would want to accommodate – which American
law does accommodate - are not conscientious. A paradigm case
for religious exemption, for most proponents of such exemptions,
is the ritual use of peyote by the Native American Church, which
the Supreme Court declined to protect in Employment Division v.
Smith,16 but which received legislative accommodation shortly
thereafter.17 Yet neither of the claimants in Smith was
motivated to use peyote by religious conscience. Al Smith was
motivated primarily by interest in exploring his Native American
racial identity, and Galen Black was merely curious about the
Church.18
Conscience is also underinclusive because it focuses on those
cases in which the agent feels impelled by a duty that she is
capable of performing without depending on external
contingencies. ―Conscience‖ is a poor characterization of the
desire of a church to expand its building to be able to hold its
growing congregation, as in City of Boerne v. Flores.19
Conscientious resistance to the law was not an option. The
reconstruction could not be done without the help of architects
and contractors, whom the city could prevent from doing the work
merely by withholding the necessary permits. The problem is
even more pronounced in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Association,20 a widely criticized decision21 in which
Native Americans objected to a proposed logging road that would
pass through an ancient worship site sacred to their tribe. The
logging road, the Court conceded, would ―virtually destroy‖ the
ability of the Native Americans ―to practice their religion.‖22
Nonetheless, the Court, evidently persuaded that exemptions had
to be based on conscience, held that there was no
constitutionally cognizable burden, because the logging road had
―no tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their

16

494 U.S. 872 (1990). This result was reversed, with respect to federal
law, by statute, which the Court has willingly followed. See Gonzales v. O
Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
17
Christopher L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager, Religious Freedom and the
Constitution 243 (2007).
18
See Garrett Epps, To an Unknown God: The Hidden History of Employment
Division v. Smith, 30 ARIZ. ST. L. REV. 953, 959–65, 978–85 (1998).
19
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
20
485 U.S. 439 (1988).
21
See, e.g., Eisgruber and Sager, Religious Freedom and the Constitution, at
91-92, 242-44; 1 Kent Greenawalt, Religion and the Constitution: Free
Exercise and Fairness 192-200 (2006); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom
at a Crossroads, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 115, 125-26 (1992).
22
485 U.S. at 451.
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religious beliefs.‖23 Once more, this result was quickly
reversed by Congress.24
In fact, as I have argued at greater length elsewhere,
American law singles out religion by treating it as a good
thing.25 The fact that conduct is religious counts as a reason
to accommodate it, conscientious or not. Defer for now the
question whether this treatment is defensible. It is in fact
what American law does.26
Leiter is not alone. Many distinguished legal theorists and
philosophers have been drawn to the idea that it is conscience,
rather than religion, that is entitled to special protection,
and the Supreme Court has sometimes embraced the same position.27
Perhaps Leiter is simply following their lead. Their reasons
for emphasizing conscience are not helpful to Leiter, however.
Leiter‘s own attraction to conscience is undertheorized.
Why might conscience ever be entitled to any special
consideration? We would need to know that before we could
decide whether religious conscience is something special.28
23

Id. at 450.
Eisgruber and Sager, Religious Freedom and the Constitution, at 243-44.
25
Corruption of Religion and the Establishment Clause, 50 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
1831 (2009); The Troublesome Religious Roots of Religious Neutrality, 84
Notre Dame L. Rev. 865 (2009); Is It Fair to Give Religion Special
Treatment?, 2006 U. of Ill. L. Rev. 571; No Expressly Religious Orthodoxy: A
Response to Steven D. Smith, 78 CHI-KENT L. REV. 729 (2003); and Secular
Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87 (2002).
26
For this reason, it is a fundamental mistake to describe this singling out
as ―toleration,‖ in Leiter‘s sense of believing a group‘s practices to be
wrong or undesirable and yet putting up with them. Why Tolerate Religion?,
at 2. American law does not treat religion, even minority religion, as wrong
or undesirable. Toleration in this sense is not the central idea of the
contemporary American regime or even a component of it, merely an historical
precursor.
27
See, e.g., Gutmann, Identity in Democracy, at 151-91; William Galston, The
Practice of Liberal Pluralism 45-71 (2005); Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Ethics
of Identity 98 (2005); Michael J. Sandel, Democracy‘s Discontent: America in
Search of a Public Philosophy 65-71 (1996); Rogers M. Smith, “Equal”
Treatment? A Liberal Separationist View, in Equal Treatment of Religion in a
Pluralistic Society 190-94 (Steven V. Monsma & J. Christopher Soper, eds.,
1998); Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble With Accommodation, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 743
(1992); Rodney K. Smith, Conscience, Coercion and the Establishment of
Religion: The Beginning of an End to the Wanderings of a Wayward Judiciary?,
43 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 917 (1993); Rodney K. Smith, Converting the Religious
Equality Amendment into a Statute with a Little “Conscience”, 1996 BYU L.
Rev. 645. The idea was endorsed by the Court in United States v. Seeger, 380
U.S. 163 (1965), and Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970). In
footnote 78 infra, I will show that even there, the Court‘s view of religion
is not confined to conscience.
28
Colonial and founding-era sources are completely unhelpful and potentially
misleading on this question, because at that time ―conscience‖ was taken to
refer only to religious matters, and the possibility of nonreligious
24
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Perhaps the will to be moral is valuable, and it warrants some
deference even if we think the agent mistaken about what
morality requires.29 Perhaps people‘s life-defining commitments,
moral or otherwise, should be accommodated where reasonably
possible.30 There are many other accounts of the appropriate
role of conscience in the law‘s treatment of persons.31 Leiter
never tells us which of these is his. He assumes that
conscience is morally significant, but he never explains why.
Much of the attractiveness of conscience for contemporary
theorists arises from its perceived capacity to resolve a
tension between free exercise and establishment principles. The
Court has declared that ―[n]either a state nor the Federal
Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid
one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another.‖32 The Establishment Clause ―mandates governmental
neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion
and nonreligion.‖33
But the Court has also acknowledged that
―the Free Exercise Clause, . . . by its terms, gives special
protection to the exercise of religion.‖34 This generates a
puzzle. It is not logically possible for the government both to
be neutral between religion and nonreligion and to give religion
special protection. Some justices and many commentators have

conscience was not even considered. See William Lee Miller, The First
Liberty: Religion and the American Republic 122-23 (1986); Michael W.
McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1409, 1494 (1990). Modern readers are often
tempted to read these sources anachronistically.
29
See, e.g., Amy Gutmann, Identity in Democracy 151-91 (2003).
30
See, e.g., Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality
280-81 (1979). Leiter comes close to this view in one footnote, where he
concedes that many religious believers ―in the industrialized nations‖ have
beliefs that are ―rarely categorical in their commands.‖ Whatever reasons
there are for tolerating these believers, they are unlikely to be ―peculiar
to this ‗softer‘ form of religious belief and practice, which is harder to
distinguish from other exercises of conscience that figure in people‘s
lives.‖ Why Tolerate Religion?, at 24 n.58. Here ―conscience‖ no longer
refers to categorical commands; it seems to be broadened to anything that
someone might want to do. Some writers understand ―conscience‖ this broadly;
see, e.g., David Richards, Toleration and the Constitution 140-44 (1986); but
there is no evidence outside this footnote that this is Leiter‘s view.
31
For a survey, see my Conscience, Volitional Necessity, and Religious
Exemptions, Legal Theory (forthcoming 2010). There are also multiple
conceptions of conscience in moral reasoning. See Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Four
Conceptions of Conscience, in Nomos XL: Integrity and Conscience (Ian Shapiro
& Robert Adams, eds., 1998).
32
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947)
33
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1968).
34
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981).
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therefore regarded the First Amendment as in tension with
itself.35
―Conscience‖ promises a way out of the dilemma by describing
the basis of free exercise in a way that specifies only the
internal psychology of the person exempted, without endorsing
any claims about religious truth. Thus it is possible to give
religion special treatment without favoring religion as such.
This has great attractions for the commentators, but the Supreme
Court has never rejected the protection of religion as such, and
has rather declared that it is permissible for the legislature
to single out religion for special treatment. So the focus on
conscience is appropriate if Leiter is trying to criticize the
commentators who have focused on it as a reason to protect
religion, such as Michael Sandel36 or Michael McConnell,37 but it
is not appropriate if he is trying to criticize American law.
Once Leiter has assumed that only conscience is the object of
religious accommodation, then the problem immediately arises why
only religious exercises of conscience are singled out for
special protection. Unsurprisingly, he concludes that there is
no justification for special tolerance for religion thus
understood. ―Singling out religion for toleration is tantamount
to thinking we ought to encourage precisely this conjunction of
categorical fervor based on epistemic indifference.‖38
The conclusion is tautological, because the initial decision
to focus on conscience takes its appeal precisely from the fact
that it does not single out religion. In short, the whole
argument of ―Why Tolerate Religion?‖ appears to be based on a
mistake about its object.
There is still an argument to be had about whether it is fair
to single out religion for special treatment. In that inquiry,
―conscience‖ turns out not to be a terribly important category.39
II. Appraisal Respect and Semantic Meaning
In his newer paper, Leiter takes up a different question:
is a person‘s religion an appropriate object of what Stephen
Darwall calls ―Appraisal Respect,‖ which ―consists in an
attitude of positive appraisal,‖ such as ―esteem or a high
35

―[T]he two Clauses . . . often exert conflicting pressures.‖ Cutter v.
Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005).
36
Michael J. Sandel, Democracy‘s Discontent: America in Search of a Public
Philosophy 65-71 (1996).
37
Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DePaul L.
Rev. 1, 30 (2000).
38
Why Tolerate Religion?, at 26.
39
See Andrew Koppelman, Is It Fair to Give Religion Special Treatment?, 2006
U. of Ill. L. Rev. 571.

8

regard for someone‖?40 Leiter concludes that such respect is not
warranted.
Leiter is writing, in part, in reaction to his University
of Chicago colleague Martha Nussbaum‘s claim that tolerance is
―too grudging and weak‖ an attitude toward religion, and we need
―special respect for the faculty in human beings in which they
search for life‘s ultimate meaning.‖ This respect is related to
the thought that ―everyone has inside something infinitely
precious, something that demands respect from us all, and
something in regard to which we are all basically equal.‖41 To
this, Leiter responds that what Nussbaum has described is not an
appropriate object of respect: ―Humans are roughly equal in
many faculties, but it seems odd to think that deficient
exercises of those faculties should elicit a moral attitude
beyond that of tolerance.‖42
Leiter‘s impatience is understandable. Nussbaum‘s
exposition of her position – which, I will argue here, is right
- is summary and underdefended. (This may be intentional, since
she may fear that any deeper specification will lose part of her
intended audience; she aims at an overlapping consensus, and the
price of this is some vagueness.43) She does not explain why
respect for a faculty must mean respect for any particular way
that the faculty is exercised. Respect for religion depends on
something more than respect for capabilities as such. So
Nussbaum ends up treating religion as something special, though
that is not her official position.44 In that position, Nussbaum
is not really that far from Leiter, since her claim is that the
power to find meaning, not that of finding religious meaning, is
what is entitled to respect.
How do we know that religion is ―deficient‖? The answer is
tied to Leiter‘s narrow definition of ―religious belief.‖ In
the second paper, he transplants the definition of ―religion‖
nearly verbatim from the first.45 Why?
40

Leiter, Foundations, at 4, quoting Stephen Darwall, Two Kinds of Respect,
88 Ethics 36, 38-39 (1977).
41
Martha Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America‘s Tradition
of Religious Equality 24, 19, 52 (2008), quoted in Leiter, Foundations, at 910.
42
Leiter, Foundations, at 10.
43
On the peculiar kind of overlapping consensus that Nussbaum proposes – very
different from that envisioned by Rawls – see my The Limits of
Constructivism: Can Rawls Condemn Female Genital Mutilation?,71 Rev. Pol.
459, 480-81 (2009).
44
See Andrew Koppelman, Is It Fair to Give Religion Special Treatment?, 2006
U. of Ill. L. Rev. 571, 597-601.
45
In the first sentence, he has inserted the qualifier ―some‖: ―Religious
belief issues in some categorical demands . . . .‖ Leiter, Foundations, at
11-12. The definitions are otherwise identical.
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When the issue was legal accommodation, our hypothesis,
above, is that Leiter understandably followed the lead of some
commentators who thought that what was being accommodated was
conscience. In the context of determining Appraisal Respect,
however, why does conscience have any role at all in the
argument? At this point, whatever reason there may have been
for defining religion narrowly has disappeared.46 In particular,
it is puzzling why religious practice is left out of account,
and the definition focuses only on belief – and not all belief,
but only belief that lacks epistemic warrant, and that generates
categorical commands. On the other hand, since belief‘s lack of
epistemic warrant is what most troubles Leiter, it is not clear
why he persists in keeping categorical commands in his
definition. Would not belief without epistemic warrant be
culpable even if it issued in no commands at all? Sometimes47
religion leads people to believe things that are manifestly
wacky: the Creation Museum in Kentucky depicts a triceratops
with a saddle.48 It‘s pretty clear what Leiter thinks of that,
but it isn‘t ―religion‖ according to his definition.
He explains that he treats beliefs as central because ―it
is hard to see how mindless or habitual religious practices
could claim whatever respect, thick or thin, is due matters of
conscience.‖49 Once again, conscience is inseparable from his
understanding of religion; any religious practice that is not
based on conscience is dismissed as ―mindless or habitual.‖
Religious action can be divided without remainder into the
mandates of conscience and mindless habit. This is a weird way
to map human action. When somebody writes a silly creationist
tract, he is probably not required to do so by conscience, but
his activity is hardly mindless. (He is vigorously using his

46

Also, he sets the task of the paper as determining what moral attitude
toward religion ―makes the most sense given what religion is.‖ Leiter,
Foundations, at 1. This way of posing the problem makes no sense if he is
referring to anything other than the semantic meaning.
47
Actually, quite a lot of the time. Only 39% of Americans believe in the
theory of evolution, smaller than the roughly 44% who think that God created
humans within the last 10,000 years. This superstition divides on party
lines, affecting 60% of Republicans and 38% of Democrats. See Frank Newport,
On Darwin’s Birthday, Only 4 in 10 Believe in Evolution, Gallup Poll, Feb.
11, 2009, available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/114544/darwin-birthdaybelieve-evolution.aspx (visited Sept. 30, 2009); Frank Newport, Republicans,
Democrats Differ on Creationism: Republicans much more likely than Democrats
to believe humans created as-is 10,000 years ago, Gallup Poll, June 20, 2008,
available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/108226/Republicans-Democrats-DifferCreationism.aspx (visited Sept. 30, 2009).
48
For a photograph, see Creation Museum, Wikipedia, available at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Creation_Museum (visited Oct. 1, 2009).
49
Leiter, Foundations, at 12.
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mind, just not very well.) Neither is a grieving mother‘s
decision to place a religious marker on the grave of her child.
Practices, religious and otherwise, are often fraught with
significance for the persons who perform them, even if the
practices are not conscientiously compelled. Core religious
practices often have nothing to do with conscience. One
illustrative bit of data: When a survey asked Catholics why
they attended Mass, the largest group, 37 percent, pointed to
―the feeling of meditating and communicating with God,‖ while
only 20 percent referred to ―the need to receive the Sacrament
of Holy Communion,‖ and only 6 percent said ―the Church requires
that I attend.‖50 This experience-based religiosity is
increasingly common in the United States across all religious
denominations.51
I have been beating up on Leiter‘s definition of religion,
but let‘s be fair: nobody‘s definition works very well.52 Leiter
denounces the ―lazy Wittgensteinian habit‖ of some scholars of
―not even attempting an analysis of ‗religion‘ on the grounds
that it is a family resemblance concept.‖53 In a footnote, he
50

Joseph Gremillion & Jim Castelli, The Emerging Parish: The Notre Dame
Study of Catholic Life Since Vatican II 132 (1987). For an argument that
this feeling of connection is central to modern American Catholic practice,
see Andrew Greeley, The Catholic Imagination (2001).
51
See Alan Wolfe, The Transformation of American Religion: How We Actually
Live Our Faith (2003); Robert Wuthnow, America and the Challenges of
Religious Diversity (2005).
52
Including mine. Leiter observes that a formulation I once proposed, ―all
belief systems that make ultimate claims about the meaning of human
existence,‖ is obviously overinclusive. Why Tolerate Religion?, at 13 n.30,
citing Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87, 135 (2002). His
criticism is accurate. My article incoherently both endorses the ―family
resemblance‖ idea, id. at 129, and attempts what looks like a definition
(which, it should have been made clear, was really just a gesture in the
direction of the family), id. at 135. I had not yet fully absorbed the
Wittgensteinian point that I make in the text below.
53
Leiter, Foundations, at 2. I don‘t know if he plans to number me among the
guilty here (many of the footnotes in his SSRN draft still need to be filled
in), but I confess. I have adopted and developed the family resemblance
concept in a series of articles. See, most recently, Corruption of Religion
and the Establishment Clause, 50 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1831, 1905-08 (2009).
The laziness that Leiter deplores is epidemic. For example:
Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the
subject-matter admits of, for precision is not to be sought for alike
in all discussions, any more than in all the products of the crafts. .
. . We must be content, then, in speaking of such subjects and with
such premisses to indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and in
speaking about things which are only for the most part true and with
premisses of the same kind to reach conclusions that are no better. In
the same spirit, therefore, should each type of statement be received;
for it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each
class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits; it is
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cites with approval Bernard Suits‘s claim that even
Wittgenstein‘s classic example, the word ―game,‖ actually is
susceptible of precise definition. It is hard to tell what
Leiter is trying to say here. Even if it were conceded that
Wittgenstein is wrong about ―game,‖ it would not follow that
every word is susceptible of precise definition, and that there
are no cluster concepts. So the implication must be that, even
if there are clusters, religion can be shown not to be one of
them if we only think hard enough. And Leiter cashes this out
with his own definition.
Whether any definition is satisfactory, as noted earlier,
will depend on what it is for. If its aim is to capture a
word‘s normal semantic meaning, by displaying the necessary and
sufficient conditions for its use, then Leiter‘s definition is a
failure, for the reasons already discussed. If it is a term of
art, then its specialized purpose needs to be made clear. In
Why Tolerate Religion?, as we have seen, he does use it as a
term of art, though his reasons for doing so evidently rest on a
mistake about American law. In Foundations, neither the
semantic nor the specialized meaning suits his purpose. He
sticks to his definition, but the object of his negative
evaluation can only be a subset – an arbitrarily drawn subset –
of religious activity.
The Wittgensteinian idea that religion is a cluster concept
is related to Wittgenstein‘s idea that words are tools, and that
―the meaning of a word is its use in the language.‖54 Since a
word may be used for any of a wide variety of purposes, far
beyond the purpose for which it was originally devised, there is
no reason to presume that there must be a neat and closed list
of necessary and sufficient conditions for the appropriate use
of a word, any more than there is a neat and closed list of
necessary and sufficient conditions for the appropriate use of a
knife or a rock.
Religion is a peculiarly bad candidate for an essence. As
Jonathan Z. Smith has observed, the term ―religion‖ denotes an
anthropological category, arising out of a particular Western
practice of encountering and accounting for foreign belief
systems associated with geopolitical entities with which the
West was forced to deal.55 Arising thus out of a specific
historical situation, and evolving in unpredictable ways
evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a
mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician scientific proofs.
Aristotle, Ethics I.3, 1094b11-27 (W.D. Ross tr.).
54
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 20 (G.E.M. Anscombe
trans., 3d ed. 1958).
55
Religion, Religions, Religious, in Critical Terms for Religious Studies 269
(Mark C. Taylor ed. 1998).
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thereafter, ―religion‖ would be surprising if it had any
essential denotation. And it covers such a huge range of human
practices that it would be equally surprising if ―religion‖ and
―religious belief‖ were equivalents.
The conflation of religion and belief is likewise an
artifact of a particular historical moment. During the
Reformation, an immediate consequence of Luther‘s objections to
Church authority was a growing, and eventually obsessive, focus
on doctrinal disputes. Elaborate theological edifices such as
Calvin‘s Institutes of the Christian Religion and the
pronouncements of the Council of Trent brought about an
understanding of religion that was based less on piety and
ritual than on intellectual assent.56 Religious persecution
during the Reformation was based centrally on the victims‘
refusal to accept specified philosophical claims. This
conception of religion is shared by modern atheists, who
understand religion to consist essentially of dubious factual
claims.57 But however important propositions were to lived
religious experience during the age of religious wars, it is
not, as we have seen, central to what religion means to
Americans today.58 It‘s my impression rather that adherence to
propositions is something of an embarrassment for many
contemporary Americans, which they tolerate because of the
benefits that religious practice provides.
Leiter observes that the singling out of religion has been
justified by some writers (myself included) because it is good,
for society or the believer or both. He dismisses this
strategy, because it ―begs the question of what religion is, and
the answers these writers offer turn out to be over- and underinclusive in rather obvious ways.‖59 The answer to this
objection is the Wittgensteinian one: there is no definition.
We know it when we see it.
How unsatisfactory is this answer? It depends on how much
doubt there is about the term‘s application. Leiter works hard
to show that his definition does not include Marxism or morality
more generally, but this is a worry only because the semantic
meaning is not doubtful; everyone already knows that these are
not religions. Foreign courts have done no better than American

56

James Turner, Without God, Without Creed: The Origins of Unbelief in
America 23-25 (1985).
57
Indeed, as Turner shows, modern atheism was made possible by this
conception of religion.
58
Or to most people on most of the planet during most of human history.
Wilford Cantwell Smith, The Meaning and End of Religion (1963).
59
Why Tolerate Religion?, at 13 n.30.

See
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courts at devising a definition.60 Even the Internal Revenue
Service uses an analogical criterion.61 Yet the consequence is
not ambiguity or confusion about what the law is singling out
for special treatment. The list of reported cases that have had
to determine a definition of ―religion‖ is a remarkably short
one.62
Leiter‘s Procrustean strategy may still be useful as a way
of isolating a specific problem, which is how to assess that
precise subset of religious ideas that do fit within his
definition. So let‘s stick to that. Leiter thinks ―religious
belief is a culpable form of false belief‖ in light of the
―ordinary epistemic standards‖ that are followed ―in common
sense and the sciences.‖63 Those standards, ―the standards of
evidence that have been vindicated a posteriori since the
scientific revolution,‖64 are evidently all anyone needs to make
his way in the world. Basing one‘s behavior on anything else is
culpable.
This condemnation does not just extend to religious
beliefs. It obviously would extend to nonreligious beliefs,
such as Holocaust denial, that are based on a failure to adhere
to the same epistemic standards. Just how far does it extend?
Pretty far. Far enough, in fact, that it is not clear that
a decision that one has an obligation to act morally is not
culpable in just the same way. It is far from clear that the
existence of any particular moral obligation can be demonstrated
using the ordinary epistemic standards that are followed in
common sense and the sciences. Leiter recognizes this problem
when he defends his definition. ―For is not morality
characterized both by categoricity of its commands and its
insulation from reasons and evidence (as reasons and evidence
are understood, e.g., in the sciences)?‖65 He does not want to
60

Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh, Religious Freedom in the Liberal State 110-26
(2005); T. Jeremy Gunn, The Complexity of Religion and the Definition of
“Religion” in International Law, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 189 (2003).
61
See Defining “Religious Organization” and “Church,” 868 Tax Mgm‘t & Port.
(BNA) III (2007).
62
See Religion, 36C Words and Phrases 153-57 (2002 & supp. 2008). The
reference I rely on here, Words and Phrases, is a 132 volume set collecting
brief annotations of cases from 1658 to the present. Each case discusses the
contested definition of a word whose meaning determines rights, duties,
obligations, and liabilities of the parties. See Words and Phrases, in
West's Encyclopedia of American Law (2d ed. 2008). Some words have received
an enormous amount of attention from the courts. Two examples, drawn at
random from the first volume of this immense compilation, each exceed 100
pages: Abandonment, 1 Words and Phrases 37-147 (2007); Abuse of Discretion,
id. at 323-462 and, in the 2008 supplement, 8-25.
63
Leiter, Foundations, at 24-25.
64
Why Tolerate Religion?, at 23.
65
Why Tolerate Religion?, at 20.
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drift too far away from the ordinary semantic meaning of
religion, so he must show that his definition does not encompass
all of morality.
He responds that the two leading philosophical schools of
thought about the nature of morality agree that morality is not
insulated from evidence in the way that religion is.
Cognitivist realists think that moral judgments can be justified
in the same way as any other judgments. For noncognitivist
antirealists, the mental states expressed by moral judgments are
―not truth-apt, i.e., are insulated from reasons and evidence,‖
and this distinguishes them from religious judgments, which ―do
express beliefs and so, in principle, could be answerable to
reasons and evidence, but are held to be insulated from them.‖66
But this does not epistemically exculpate the moral
behavior of most people, who are unfamiliar with this
philosophical literature. They are not relying on the fact (if
it is a fact) that the philosophers have established that moral
judgments are ontologically and epistemologically
distinguishable from religious judgments. The conclusions of
contemporary philosophy are far more esoteric than those of
contemporary science. If one is culpable for not being familiar
with the former, than most of humanity is invincibly culpable,
if that label is even coherent.67 On a practical and
phenomenological level, the basis for moral judgments is often
hard to distinguish from the basis for religious judgments. In
each case, people rely on some combination of testimony and
intuition,68 and even moral heroes may be deeply inarticulate
about the basis of their intuitions.69
But here we are once again speaking of conscience, and as
noted earlier, religious people (and most nonreligious people as
well) think that they live in a world that has moral

66

Why Tolerate Religion? at 20-21; Foundations, at 18-19.
I think it is not. The old theological idea of invincible ignorance
referred to the problem of persons (such as pagans and infants) who are
ignorant of the Christian message because they have never had any opportunity
to hear it. Such people were not thereby made culpable for the same reason
that ―invincible culpability‖ makes no sense: ought implies can.
68
See Larry Alexander, Liberalism, Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology,
30 San Diego L. Rev. 763 (1993).
69
David Velleman observes that people who took terrifying risks in order to
save Jews from the Holocaust ―often disappointed postwar interviewers who
asked about their reasoning and motives,‖ because they often failed to invoke
any moral concepts such as obligation or virtue. Instead they offered such
unsatisfactory answers as, ―I cannot give you any reasons. It was not a
question of reasoning. Let‘s put it this way. There were people in need and
we helped them.‖ David Velleman, How We Get Along 155-56 (2009), quoting
Samuel P. Oliner & Pearl M. Oliner, The Altruistic Personality: Rescuers of
Jews in Nazi Europe 216 (1988).
67
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significance that reaches far beyond the very limited field of
categorical commands.
III. What Good is Religion?
The relevant category is not categorical command, but what
Charles Taylor calls ―strong evaluation,‖ a set of assessments
that involve ―discriminations of right or wrong, better or
worse, higher or lower, which are not rendered valid by our own
desires, inclinations, or choices, but rather stand independent
of these and offer standards by which they can be judged.‖70 A
person who did not make any such discriminations, a ―simple
weigher of alternatives,‖71 would be a very strange sort of
person; it is not clear whether there could be a person so
lacking in depth.72
For many, Taylor observes, strong evaluation is inseparable
from religion: ―their highest sense of the good has been
developed in a profoundly religious context,‖ and ―is
inconceivable without God.‖73 Their understanding that the world
makes sense, that they live significant, morally intelligible
lives in a significant, morally intelligible world, is closely
tied to their religious beliefs and practices.
The basic social function of religion, Peter Berger
observed long ago, is one of a distinctive kind of legitimation:
―Religion legitimates social institutions by bestowing upon them
an ultimately valid ontological status, that is, by locating
them within a sacred and cosmic frame of reference.‖74 This
entails a personal function for individuals as well: ―the
cosmization of the institutions permits the individual to have
an ultimate sense of rightness, both cognitively and
normatively, in the roles he is expected to play in society.‖75
This way of putting matters sounds conservative, but the point
applies equally to the roles of social critic, reformer, and
revolutionary.
One may object that this is epistemically culpable: there
is no basis for any confidence that anything in the world
ultimately is validated by a transcendent frame of reference.
70

Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity 4
(1989).
71
Charles Taylor, What is Human Agency?, in Human Agency and Language: 1
Philosophical Papers 23 (1985).
72
Id. at 28; Sources at 27. Even utilitarians who are officially committed
to such simple weighing tend to be animated by motives of a loftier sort;
they cannot account for their own existence. See Sources at 76-86, 322-45.
73
Charles Taylor, A Secular Age 544 (2007).
74
Peter L. Berger, The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of
Religion 33 (Anchor ed. 1969).
75
Id. at 37.
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We just have to learn to live without any ultimate sense of
rightness. But this is also a kind of faith: there is no basis
for confidence in the rejection of a transcendent frame of
reference, either. The old agnostic point, that a finite being
cannot know an infinite one, cuts both ways. How can you know
that there is no transcendent frame?76 What epistemic warrant is
there for that bold claim? It is possible to be a strong
religious adherent while fully acknowledging one‘s lack of
epistemic certainty.77
What is really indispensable is hope.78 There is no
epistemic warrant to assert with confidence that the religious
person‘s hope is groundless. If this is true – and the
arguments for agnosticism are familiar – then the insistence
upon the contrary is itself a culpably false belief.
This is part of what is wrong with Leiter‘s claim that ―the
(de facto) establishment of atheism or non-religiosity ought to

76

I have always been fond of the following two-line joke:
Q. Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you God?
A. If I knew the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, I would be God.
77
Many illustrations are available. One is the present Pope, Benedict XVI:
[B]oth the believer and the unbeliever share, each in his own way,
doubt and belief, if they do not hide from themselves and from the
truth of their being. Neither can quite escape either doubt or belief;
for the one, faith is present against doubt; for the other, through
doubt and in the form of doubt. It is the basic pattern of man's
destiny only to be allowed to find the finality of his existence in
this unceasing rivalry between doubt and belief, temptation and
certainty. Perhaps in precisely this way doubt, which saves both sides
from being shut up in their own worlds, could become an avenue of
communication. It prevents both from enjoying complete selfsatisfaction; it opens up the believer to the doubter and the doubter
to the believer; for one, it is his share in the fate of the
unbeliever; for the other, the form in which belief remains
nevertheless a challenge to him.
Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity 40-1 (rev. ed. 2004).
78
The Supreme Court has quoted with approval Paul Tillich‘s description of
God as ―the depths of your life, of the source of your being, of your
ultimate concern, of what you take seriously without any reservation.‖
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 187 (1965), quoting Paul Tillich, The
Shaking of the Foundations 57 (1948). That is already a more capacious idea
than ―conscience,‖ even though Seeger is often cited for the proposition
(supported by other passages in the opinion) that conscience is what the
Court is protecting. A few pages later in the same essay, Tillich writes:
―Perhaps you should call this depth hope, simply hope. For if you find hope
in the ground of history, you are united with the great prophets who were
able to look into the depth of their times, who tried to escape it, because
they could not stand the horror of their visions, and who yet had the
strength to look to an even deeper level and there to discover hope.‖
Tillich at 59.
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be an option for government.‖79 Aside from the fact that such
establishment would be bitterly divisive, the government has no
basis for knowing that atheism is true.80
We know that religion is not indispensable to
intelligibility: many individuals, and even a few national
cultures, function perfectly well without it. But the ability
to do without religion is a late and peculiar historical
formation. Modern humanism is itself shot through with quasireligious longings and even rituals.81 For most people,
liberation from religious belief would produce only anomie and
despair.
Leiter shares, and seeks to clarify, Simon Blackburn‘s
concern about ―respect creep,‖ an unfortunate cultural pathology
in which the reasonable demand for minimal toleration gets
transmuted into an unreasonable demand for deference and
reverence.82 But Blackburn‘s discussion leaves open the question
when reverence is appropriate. Blackburn himself positively
admires religious artists such as Donne, Milton, and Bach, who
―try to give voice to the great events and emotions of human
life‖ in religious terms.83 His essay is fascinating because it
begins with a stance of suspicious hostility toward religion and
slowly works its way toward a complex ambivalence, in which
religion perhaps simply stands for ―remembrances and pieties
that it is human to have and that desperately need protection
against the encroaching world of cost-benefit analysis and the
surrendering of unbridled power to economic interest.‖84 Leiter
79

Leiter, Foundations, at 28.
In Why Tolerate Religion?, at 13 n.30, Leiter offers, as evidence that my
understanding of religion is overbroad, the fact that I include as an example
of a religious view Nietzsche‘s claim that ―[t]he total character of the
world . . . is in all eternity chaos—in the sense not of a lack of necessity
but of a lack of order, arrangement, form, beauty, wisdom, and whatever other
names there are for our aesthetic anthropomorphisms.‖ Friedrich Nietzsche,
The Gay Science 168 (Walter Kaufmann trans., Vintage Books 1974) (1887),
quoted in Koppelman, Secular Purpose, at 131. There is no doubt, however,
that the teaching of Nietzsche‘s view as correct, in the public schools,
would violate the ban on establishment of religion. Part of the reason is
that there‘s no basis for confidence that Nietzsche is right. Another large
part is that religion is regarded as a good thing which is likely to be
damaged by deliberate government manipulation. See my Corruption of Religion
and the Establishment Clause.
81
Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (2007); Regina Mara Schwartz, Sacramental
Poetics at the Dawn of Secularism: When God Left the World (2008).
82
Simon Blackburn, Religion and Respect, in Philosophers Without Gods:
Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life 179 (Louise M. Anthony ed. 2007).
83
Id. at 186.
84
Id. at 193. Like Leiter, Blackburn deplores the tendency of the religious
to believe dubious propositions of fact. Many modern theologians, he
observes, try to rescue their position by rejecting such propositional claims
as ―onto-religion‖ and instead adopting an ―expressive interpretation‖ in
80
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agrees with Blackburn that religion can produce good outcomes,
but Leiter is more transparently instrumentalist: religion is
valuable only insofar as some religious people are led by their
faith to do good things. The ―remembrances and pieties‖ don‘t
seem to have any intrinsic value for him.
It is not possible to offer a unitary account of what
religion is good for. Like a knife or a rock, it is something
that people find already existing in the world, which they then
put to a huge variety of uses. ―Religion‖ denotes a cluster of
goods, including salvation (if you think you need to be saved),
harmony with the transcendent origin of universal order (if it
exists),85 responding to the fundamentally imperfect character of
human life (if it is imperfect),86 courage in the face of the
heartbreaking aspects of human existence (if that kind of
encouragement helps),87 a transcendent underpinning for the
resolution to act morally (if that kind of underpinning helps),88
contact with that which is awesome and indescribable (if awe is
something you feel),89 and many others.90 No general description
of the good that religion seeks to promote can be satisfactory,
politically or intellectually.91
which religion merely expresses an emotional stance toward the world. In
order for this expressive stance to be psychologically sustainable, Blackburn
objects, the ontological bit has to persist; without it the emotional part
would lose its force. Id. at 185. He is probably right about this, but why
presume that the amplification comes from certainty about the ontological
part? Once more, hope may be enough to do the job.
85
John M. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights 89-90 (1980).
86
Keith E. Yandell, Philosophy of Religion: A Contemporary Introduction 17-34
(1999).
87
Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be (1952).
88
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason (1788; Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997); Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone (1794;
New York: Harper, 1960).
89
Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy (2d ed. 1950).
90
Here I am in agreement with McConnell, who argues that ―[r]eligion is a
special phenomenon, in part, because it plays such a wide variety of roles in
human life,‖ and elaborates the point with a large collection of
heterogeneous illustrations. ―[T]here is no other human phenomenon that
combines all [the aspects of religion]; if there were such a concept, it
would probably be viewed as a religion.‖ McConnell, The Problem of Singling
Out Religion, at 42.
91
Charles Taylor has stated the difficulties for any general theory of
religion (and incidentally has shown the difficulty with Nussbaum‘s reduction
of it to the search for meaning):
I doubt very much whether any such general theory can even be
established. I mean a theory which can gather all the powerful élans
and aspirations which humans have manifested in the spiritual realm,
and relate them to some single set of underlying needs or aims or
tendencies (whether it be the desire for meaning or something else).
The phenomena are much too varied and baffling for that; and even if
they were more tractable, we would have to stand at the end of history
to be able to draw such conclusions.
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The value of religion will sometimes be a fit occasion for
ambivalence, in the same way that one is reasonably ambivalent
about any human good that is sometimes abused by its possessor.
It is good for people to be clever and resourceful, but it would
have been better if Hitler had been less clever and resourceful
than he was. Similarly, as Leiter observes, the devoutly
religious include, on the one hand, those who opposed Naziism in
Germany and apartheid in South Africa and the United States, but
on the other, those who bomb abortion clinics and fly airplanes
into buildings.92 It would be better if the latter‘s ultimate
sense of rightness were replaced by vertiginous disorientation.
But that does not mean that the sense of rightness is not a
human good, a good for the person who possesses it.
Leiter relies in part on the work of Macklem, but he does
not address Macklem‘s argument that sometimes, a complete set of
reasons for action is unavailable, but action would nonetheless
facilitate our well-being.93 In such a situation, where
commitment is rationally underdetermined, Macklem argues that
―faith is valuable where the inability to make the commitments
that faith makes possible would have a negative impact on wellbeing, both because the commitments in question are potentially
valuable and because failure to make them would be harmful.‖94
Macklem is right about this.
Macklem nonetheless worries: ―The difficulty with faith,
secular or religious, is that it often serves as a substitute
for knowledge and reason in settings where these are not only
available but constitute a sounder basis for action and
belief.‖95 He‘s right about this, too, as we saw in our earlier
review of creationist piffle. Reading Leiter, however, one gets
the impression that this is the only aspect of religion that he
notices.
Macklem is correct that what interests us is not religion‘s
semantic meaning, but its moral significance. Is there any
reason to assign moral significance to the contents of the loose
baggy sack of heterogenous phenomena that fit within the
Taylor, A Secular Age, at 679.
92
Why Tolerate Religion?, at 16; Foundations, at 12.
93
Here he is some distance from Leiter. For Macklem, faith is believing
something when reasons are unavailable. The idea that reasons might just be
unavailable is never even considered by Leiter: faith is ―believing
something notwithstanding the evidence and reasons that fail to support it or
even contradict it.‖ Leiter, Foundations, at 14, emphases in original.
94
Macklem, Independence of Mind, at 140. Macklem‘s view of religion is
nonetheless condescending: he writes that ―for some people the nature of
life and the content of morality are unknowable on the basis of reason
alone,‖ id. at 139-40, implying that he is one of the smart ones who has the
nature of life all figured out. Lucky him.
95
Id. at 140.
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semantic meaning of ―religion‖?96 Is there any reason to treat
the stuff in the sack as good? Macklem doubts it. The
Wittgensteinian mess means that religion as such can‘t have
moral significance. He proposes that courts undertake ―a frank
examination of the contribution that any doctrine held on the
basis of faith, be it traditional or non-traditional, is capable
of making to well-being.‖97
There are two decisive objections to Macklem‘s proposal,
one political and one moral. The political objection is that,
in a pluralistic society, there are obvious dangers in giving
judges the power to assign legal consequences to different
religious beliefs based on the judges‘ own conceptions of wellbeing. Macklem‘s own confident withholding of protection from
―cults‖ is not reassuring.98 The moral objection is that it is
arrogant to assess the entirety of another‘s lifeworld and
confidently conclude that, taken as a whole, it is so silly that
the person would be better off with a radical conversion.
Perhaps we‘re entitled to do this with respect to people whose
lives are manifestly wretched, such as homeless drug addicts,
but we don‘t know most of our fellow citizens well enough to
make such judgments with any degree of confidence. There are
enough good things in the sack that there are sufficient reasons
to pronounce the sack as such a container of good things, and to
respect the other fellow‘s sack despite – or, perhaps, because –
we aren‘t sure just what is in it.99 So the decision to define
96

Cf. Shel Silverstein, What’s In the Sack?, in Where the Sidewalk Ends 111
(1974):
What's in the sack? What's in the sack?
Is it some mushrooms or is it the moon?
Is it love letters or downy goosefeathers?
Or maybe the world's most enormous balloon?
What's in the sack? That's all they ask me.
Could it be popcorn or marbles or books?
Is it two years' worth of your dirty laundry,
Or the biggest ol' meatball that's ever been cooked? . . .
97
Macklem, Independence of Mind, at 142.
98
Id.
99
Macklem writes:
If a body of people claims that Jesus lives and that they depend upon
faith in that fact for their sense of purpose in life, it is possible
for us to recognize and respect that claim without either endorsing it
or seeing any reason to endorse it, for faith in the Resurrection and
its implications is one way of coming to terms with death, an issue
that we can all recognize to be in some sense genuinely mysterious.
But if a body of people claims that Elvis lives and that they depend
upon faith in that fact in order to carry on in life we would be forced
to conclude that they needed professional help, for belief that Elvis
is still alive and eating cheeseburgers is not a way of coming to terms
with death or any other mystery in life but is simply an unfortunate
and damaging consequence of the cult of celebrity.
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religion vaguely, relying on the fuzzy semantic meaning, itself
rests on moral grounds.100
So there is warrant for deeming the contents of the sack,
the whole set of beliefs and practices that constitute
―religion,‖ to be worthy of Appraisal Respect. This, then, can
justify the special treatment of religion by the law. As Leiter
observes, although Appraisal Respect demands only esteem, not
any particular action, it ―can also result in moral demands on
action, when the highly appraised features are ones with moral
value or that one has a moral obligation to support or
protect.‖101 In particular, governments are morally obligated
―to protect and perhaps even promote those practices that ought

Id. at 145, footnote omitted. I agree that the claim about Elvis is as
factually stupid as the triceratops with the saddle, but how can Macklem know
that this is not a way of coming to terms with life‘s mysteries? I‘d need to
know a lot more about the role of Elvis in these people‘s lives before I
could confidently conclude that nothing about their strange beliefs is worthy
of respect. From the standpoint of science, the belief in the resurrection
of Jesus is equally indefensible.
Beliefs serve two functions, which we may call epistemic and
existential. They can provide accurate maps of the world; they can also help
to cope with life‘s mysteries. These functions sometimes come into tension
with one another. It‘s nice to be able to do both, but evidently that is not
so easy for everyone. The creationists‘ epistemic folly is contemptible, but
it is not pointless, and its effectiveness at performing the existential
function may be an appropriate object of Appraisal Respect, in the same way I
can admire your skill at opening a can with a screwdriver.
100
Here it is not clear to me just how far I am from Nussbaum. She proposes a
complex position, in which the reasons for accommodation are modified by
institutional constraints, so that religion receives special treatment only
because a broader accommodation for ―the faculty in human beings with which
they search for life‘s ultimate meaning‖ would not be administrable. Liberty
of Conscience at 19. Conscience should be protected because it is valuable
and vulnerable; it ―needs a protected space around it within which people can
pursue their search for life‘s meaning (or not pursue it, if they choose).‖
Id.; see also id. at 37. This does not single out religion. On the other
hand, ―fair or unfair,‖ id. at 102, the text of the free exercise clause does
single out religion. The best reason for this singling out is that
nonreligious reasons for seeking accommodation ―are more likely to be
personal and individualistic, thus far more difficult to assess for sincerity
and significance.‖ Id. at 165. In short, things in the sack are more likely
to be humanly important than things outside it. Nussbaum approves of the
Court‘s extension, in Seeger and Welsh, of the definition of religion to
include ―forms of committed searching for meaning that had no group
affiliation,‖ id. at 171, but she acknowledges that this stretch perpetuates
a different kind of unfairness, because it will ―reward articulate people and
penalize those, equally sincere, who cannot give a good account of
themselves.‖ Id. at 172. This unfairness is at least somewhat ameliorated
by the singling out of religion, since the protection of religion as such is
likely to protect some confused and inarticulate, but sincere, people. See,
e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
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to command Appraisal Respect.‖102 If the contents of the sack
deserve Appraisal Respect, then the government should protect
and perhaps even promote them, too.
Leiter of course is having none of this. He appears to
think that it‘s easy to live in a morally intelligible universe,
and that no one ever needs to go outside the resources of
science and philosophy to do so. Those who reach for something
transcendent are epistemically culpable. His confidence is
strangely reminiscent of that of John Finnis, who has lately
managed to convince himself that the truth of the specific
claims of Christianity about the events of the Gospels are
knowable by any reasonable person.103 Neither of them can
imagine how a world view can work for them while other people
can live in such radically different pictures: the others must
be, not only wrong, but demonstrably mistaken!
Life is in many ways perplexing and hard. Finding a
language to describe our deepest commitments and hopes is
especially hard. Philosophy may possibly have the resources to
fill this need for a few people, but it‘s a specialized taste.104
Some people find a full and satisfying meaning of life in the
goods of the immanent world,105 but that is a specialized taste
too.
So even when I find that religious people believe things
that seem to me incredible, I remind myself that they are simply
doing the best they can with the limited information that‘s
available to all of us, and that I‘m not myself doing much
better than they.106 Intelligibility, and the courage we need to
act well, is indeed a precious thing, and the fact that it
exists at all is far more important than the strange variety of
forms that it takes. So I have no trouble at all mustering
appraisal respect for other people‘s religious beliefs.
Leiter simply doesn‘t see the predicament that most people
are up against. If there happen to be any holes in the
102
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John Finnis, Religion and State: Some Main Issues and Sources, 51 Am. J.
Juris. 107, 107-111, 114-16 (2006); see also id. at 111 (specifically
criticizing Leiter‘s conception of religion). He was once more cautious.
See Natural Law and Natural Rights, supra.
104
Even many philosophers who look down on religion are humbler than this.
Hegel, for instance, no model of humility, thought that religion, despite its
manifest imperfections, was the best way to make what is knowable via
philosophy intelligible to ordinary people. He understood (with regret!)
that not everyone can be a philosopher. For a clear exposition, see Mark
Lilla, The Stillborn God: Religion, Politics, and the Modern West 171-213
(2007).
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philosophical apparatus in which he finds such comfort, then he
is up against it himself, though he doesn‘t know it. His
position is blind to reality. It‘s hard to have much respect
for that.
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